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ABSTRACT
We analyze the effect of the European Union Competition
Authority’s block exemption towards R&D cooperatives in a horizon-
tal market structure, valid as long as the combined product market
share is not too large. Two less efficient firms attempt to catch up
with a technological leader, and may use the safe harbour provided
by the legislation. We consider when the incentives of the R&D-per-
forming firms are aligned with those of consumers, and when
increases in the market share limit improves welfare. We show that
an effective policy within this framework might be elusive. The mar-
ket share restriction must be set in order that it is optimal for firms
to use the safe harbour, and that this leads to more R&D than under
competition. Even in this case, further increases in the market share
restriction can harm welfare. This has widespread implications for
how the EU Competition authority should respond to calls for an
increase in the market share restriction.
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In 2002, European ministers announced a goal of turning the EU into the most
competitive knowledge-based economy in the world, with R&D spending of 3% of
GDP by 2010. The desired level of R&D spending was not reached, so the time frame
was extended to 2020 (Sheehan and Wyckoff 2003). This goal still lies far ahead; the
R&D intensity in the EU was 2.07 in 2017, with two-thirds of this spent in the business
enterprise sector.1 One instrument for encouraging R&D spending within the
European Union is to allow product market competitors to form cooperative R&D
agreements if they fulfill the criteria of the block exemption laid out in Commission
Regulation (EU) No. 1217/2010. The block exemption defines the parameters for a safe
harbour within which cooperative agreements are deemed to comply with EU compe-
tition law without the need to analyze the effect on competition. One of the provi-
sions here is that horizontal firms can join together in an R&D cooperative if they ex
ante do not possess more than 25% of total market share, and if the firms’ market
share arising out of the R&D cooperation (ex post), within the relevant market for
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products, services or technologies, does not become too high. Indeed, with an ex post
market share of up to 25%, firms can benefit from the block exemption for seven
years, whereas the exemption period is two years for market shares of 25–30%, and
one year for an ex post market share above 30%. The period of validity of this regula-
tion started from January 1st 2011 and shall expire on December 31st 2022.2 The
introduction of a market share limit is supposed to maintain the balance between
product market competition and R&D investments, where agreements falling within
the block exemption are assumed to be such that the positive effect from R&D out-
weighs the negative effect that increased concentration in the product market might
have.3 The onus is on the cooperating firms to self assess any potential agreement in
order to be sure that the safe harbour applies, and many legal guides are readily on
offer to aid the evaluation.4
In this paper, we analyze the implications of the R&D block exemption, and how the
application of the market share limit influences incentives to use the safe harbour, and
how changes in this limit can affect profits, consumer surplus and hence welfare. Our
main model involves R&D active firms that compete with a technological leader, inves-
ting in R&D to make their production more efficient in order to capture a larger share of
the product market.5 Assuming initially that the leader does not perform R&D, we derive
conditions under which the laggards prefer to cooperate under the block exemption,
and when this increases R&D investment in line with the desired EU outcome. We also
demonstrate how the market share limit should be set to maximize welfare in the market
in question. The model is then extended to the case in which the leader actually does
perform R&D to demonstrate the wider applicability of our conclusions. This case is inter-
esting from a strategic point of view since the adherence to the market share limit by
cooperating laggards can be used by the leader to calculate its optimal R&D investment.
The analysis thus provides input to policy makers who must decide whether the block
exemption should be renewed and/or adjusted when the current period expires.
The results reflect a nuanced view of the R&D block exemption policy. In previous lit-
erature, it is well known that most R&D will be performed by firms that do not cooperate
on this activity when there are low spillovers between firms in the industry.6 When the
spillovers are larger, we show that when firms choose to take advantage of the safe har-
bour, that this gives more actual R&D than competition would have yielded. Furthermore,
since consumer surplus is increasing in R&D, this strategy by the firms also benefits the
consumers. Hence, when firms decide to operate within the block exemption, this auto-
matically fulfills the aims of the policy relating to R&D effort and being of benefit to con-
sumers. In our welfare analysis, we show that the relationship between total welfare and
the market share limit is not monotonic. Increasing the market share limit is beneficial in
the sense that it allows firms to perform more R&D without moving away from the legal
security given by the safe harbour. More R&D is efficiency-enhancing in itself; on the
other hand, increasing the market share limit allows less efficient firms to serve a larger
part of the market which is not efficient. In extending our analysis to the case in which
the technological leader also can perform R&D, we show that investment of the cooperat-
ing firms and in total can be reduced when the market share limit increases.
Asymmetry is a key feature of our model, building on the framework of
Halmenschlager (2004), and several cases provide motivation for our asymmetric
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model. One is the cooperation between GlaxoSmithKline and Pfizer in 2009, who
intended to challenge Gilead Sciences, the leader in HIV-drug development and mar-
keting.7 Gilead was at the time the market leader in HIV treatment with a drug called
Truvada, whilst Glaxo marketed two drugs, Combivir and Epzicom. The Financial Times
reported that the cooperative venture would have a 19% share of the global HIV mar-
ket, and GSK’s chief executive, Andrew Witty, is quoted as saying:” This is a new and
unique way of incentivising research success and deciding how to allocate research
and development capital”.8 Lee (2016) notes that catching up is a common phenom-
enon in technological industries where laggards attempt to emulate existing technolo-
gies, and make production cost-effective, mentioning the case of dynamic RAM chips
in which” Incumbent leading firms are less strongly inclined to initiate next generation
chip development since they want to fully exploit profits from the current generation
chip” (Lee 2016, 185). Intel was a leading firm that behaved in this way, and Samsung
a late entrant attempting to catch up. In an analysis of high-tech manufacturing in the
US 1972–99, Coad (2011) finds a high positive correlation between R&D performed by
leading firms and their market value, whereas innovative activity is not so valuable for
laggards. He suggests that laggards should achieve productivity growth through effi-
cient exploitation and imitation of existing technology; furthermore, he notes that
there are certain ”advantages of backwardness” that allow the laggard to catch up
such us access to the frontier production technology, and the ability to learn from the
leader’s mistakes.
Prior to the revision of the original legislation for the block exemption on R&D cooper-
ation in 2010, a public consultation of stakeholders was held. 9 Many of the responses
show that the R&D block exemption can be an important instrument to facilitate cooper-
ation, but that attitudes to the 25% market limit were varied. In its answer to the consult-
ation, the communications company Alcatel Lucent stated: ”Cooperation with other
parties in research and development has been an important means for Alcatel Lucent
(ALU) to bring innovative new products to the market… . Since it came into force in
2001, (… .), the research and development block exemption regulation has been critical
in providing the legal security that ALU requires before it can commit to joint R&D proj-
ects”. At the other end of the scale, Licensing Executives Society Inc - the largest profes-
sional organization in the field of intellectual property - queries the utility of the R&D
block exemption, asking if such an instrument is necessary. Further, some stakeholders
such as Google and The European Chemical Industry Council suggested that the market
share threshold is too low, whilst the American Bar Association suggested a market share
cap of 35%. This view was shared by the International Bar Association who also empha-
sized the relationship between the guidelines and the Lisbon strategy: ”the review pro-
cess should focus on simplifying and streamlining those texts and put them more in line
with the objectives of the Lisbon Agenda, in particular by removing any disincentive
against stimulation of competitiveness, innovation and growth”. In addition, economists
also debate informally the setting of the market share limit, although little analysis has
appeared in the formal literature.10
As the current period of legislation is drawing to a close, the European Commission
has once again held a public consultation to examine whether the regulation should be
allowed to lapse, be prolonged, or revised.11 There were 77 stakeholders who responded
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to the survey, of which 25 provided detailed replies. Eight of these relied on the R&D
block exemption, including Volkswagen, Nokia and BASF, the world’s leading chemical
company. In all, 70% of all respondents had cause to check the R&D block exemption
guidelines often or occasionally, and the main benefits of the legislation were reported
to be the legal certainty that it grants since it is enforceable in the whole EU area; this
increases the scope for cross-border R&D and also lowers the cost of entering collabora-
tive agreements. Of the respondents who expressed an opinion, 19 of 29 thought that
the market share restriction is too low; the European Competition Lawyers Forum sug-
gests ”that the threshold of the R&D Block Exemption should be raised, or even abol-
ished, given the largely positive effects of joint R&D. The current cap of 25% is not
indicative of market power: market shares at that level rarely raise significant antitrust
concerns, particularly with regard to R&D and innovation”. We attempt to provide some
formal advice as to how this limit should be set, also in the light of the fact that the cur-
rent period for the legislation is drawing to an end.
1.1. Related literature
Ruble and Versaevel (2014) offer a comprehensive analysis of the R&D block exemp-
tion for the case of symmetric firms in Cournot oligopoly, some of which may form an
R&D joint venture. Their focus is on the effects that this has on the R&D level and
hence consumer surplus. In the version of the model that most closely resembles
ours,12 the authors reiterate the result of D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) that for
large enough spillovers, R&D agreements are desirable for any level of market share.
Furthermore, they show that restricting market share can rule out some cases in which
cooperation would be desirable. Whilst our model limits the number of participating
firms, an important asymmetry is introduced which means that less efficient firms can
perform R&D to attempt to catch up with the market leader.13 Such R&D is not neces-
sarily welfare-enhancing, and cooperation within the block exemption may not be
socially desirable even when knowledge spillovers are high; this follows since costly
R&D allows less efficient producers to serve a larger share of the market. In Ruble and
Versaevel (2014) all firms benefit from R&D whether they are innovators, or simply pas-
sively receive spillovers (imitators); furthermore, their work covers the case in which
R&D collaborators fulfill the market share restriction ex ante, but do not consider the
market ex post of R&D investment. Since the block exemption regulation introduces
time restrictions on agreements that violate the market share criterion ex post, we
explicitly consider this in our analysis. Specifically, we consider R&D agreements that
are sustainable in the sense of not exceeding the specified market share in the ex
post production market.14
The literature on cooperative R&D agreements (starting with Katz 1986) has grown
extensive over the years. Policy makers are of course interested in assessing to what
extent value is created by a joint R&D venture, and to what extent it is lost due to
less competition. Scott (2008, 1306) takes an overall big-picture view ”that for a broad
range of circumstances there would be less R&D investment as competitive pressure is
lessened”. Hence, the R&D block exemption would seem to be at odds with the aim
of increasing R&D activity. There are several hindrances that may serve to make the
4 D. J. CLARK ET AL.
R&D level of firms lower than that desired by the EU at the macro level. De Bondt
(1997) notes that firms’ private incentives to invest in R&D are negatively affected by
uncertainty from the R&D process, and Hagedoorn (1993) claims that increasing speed
of technological development leaves firms with less time to recover their costs. In add-
ition, high costs associated with the development of new products and technologies
also deters firms from investing on their own (Galbraith 1952 and Kamien, Muller, and
Zang 1992), which is supported by the empirical findings of Cohen and Klepper (1996)
showing a positive relationship between process R&D and firm size.15 With positive
externalities in product innovation, R&D competition involves a free-rider problem. In
this case, Besanko and Wu (2013) show that R&D competition results in lower or equal
ex ante investment than under research cooperation, and that R&D cooperation can
be welfare improving independent of the technology spillover. With this background,
Hewitt-Dundas (2006) suggests that policy initiatives to encourage more firms - and
especially small firms - to innovate should involve less legislative and regulatory con-
straints, and less red tape. The EU block exemption on cooperative R&D arrangements
can be seen as a step in this direction. On the other hand, one sees the view that
cooperative R&D agreements among product market competitors may increase the
possibility of product market collusion (Motta 2004; Suetens 2008). The market share
limit of the block exemption can limit this effect, however.
A different institutional setup is considered by Ferrett and Poyago-Theotoky (2016)
who explicitly compare a full merger situation (common R&D and production) with a
Research Joint Venture that may not be enforceable and not generate knowledge
spillovers between the parties. With identical firms, a horizontal merger is preferred by
participants if there are few actors in the market (due to increased market power); this
however, may provoke aggressive behaviour in the product market from competitors
who are outside of the merger. The gain from merging is smaller when the cost of
R&D is high, since less R&D is performed; this, together with better contract quality
leads to an RJV being preferred by the cooperating firms as well at to society as a
whole. Similar to Ferrett and Poyago-Theotoky (2016), we consider the optimal choice
of participating firms, but do not always find that some form of cooperation will be
entered in to: in our case cooperation is limited by the market share constraint which
may make it infeasible. We also consider firms that are different ex ante.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, the main model is pre-
sented, and the cases of R&D competition, free R&D cooperation and R&D cooperation
restricted by the market share limit are derived. In Section 3, we present our main ana-
lysis in which we seek to look at the following research questions: i) when will firms want
to use a block exemption to facilitate R&D cooperation?, ii) when is this the most profit-
able strategy for firms?, iii) when is this welfare-enhancing for consumers?, iv) how is wel-
fare affected by the market share limit? Section 4 presents an extension of the basic
model in which also the market leader may perform R&D. Section 5 concludes.
2. The model
In the basic model - adapted from Halmenschlager (2004) - there are three firms in
the market producing a homogenous product, and there is production cost asymmetry
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between the market leader, who does not conduct any R&D, and two lagging firms
(laggards). Halmenschlager (2004) justifies the assumption of no R&D by the leader by
suggesting that this firm considers its cost advantage large enough, or that it has
adopted all existing new processes. 16 The inverse market demand function is linear
and given by:
P ¼ 1Q (1)
where P is the product price and Q is total quantity produced. The firms have constant
production cost, and the technological leader holds a cost advantage over the sym-
metric laggards; the leader’s production cost is normalized to zero. The two lagging
firms have cost function:
ciðxi, xjÞ ¼ c xi  bxj, i ¼ 1, 2, i 6¼ j (2)
where xi denotes firm i’s R&D effort, b is the exogenous spillover parameter from the
R&D process, with b 2 0, 1½ , and the ex ante unit production cost, c< 12 :17 The firms’
R&D costs are assumed to take the form F þ cðxiÞ22 i¼ 1, 2, with c representing R&D effi-
ciency, and F is an avoidable fixed cost. To satisfy the criterion laid out in Amir et. al
(2008) that one laboratory should be more efficient at the same level of spending
than two, we assume F  cb2c2
2ð1þb2Þ :
18 The leader is assumed to have adopted all new
processes available, and there are no R&D spillovers leaking from or to the leader.
In this two stage game, the laggards choose their R&D investment, x1 and x2
respectively, at the first stage. In the second stage the three firms engage in Cournot
competition; the laggards produce q1 and q2 and the technological leader q3 so
that Q ¼ q1 þ q2 þ q3:
The game is solved through backwards induction, calculating the subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium. This reveals the second stage profit functions for the laggards and
the technological leader respectively:





 F, i ¼ 1, 2, i 6¼ j (3)
P3 ¼ ð1QÞq3: (4)
Maximizing profit at the second stage for the three firms, reveals the Nash equilibrium
quantity output for the firms:
qi xi, xjð Þ ¼
12cþ xið3bÞ þ xjð3b1Þ
4
, i ¼ 1, 2: i 6¼ j (5)
q3ðxi, xjÞ ¼
1þ 2cð1þ bÞðxi þ xjÞ
4
: (6)
From (5) we see that the threshold at which laggards benefit from the other firm’s
R&D efforts is found at b  13 : That is, an increase in firm j’s R&D spending would
increase firm i’s equilibrium quantity level.
In order to be able to cooperate on R&D within the block exemption, the combined
ex ante market share of the laggards cannot exceed k :
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q1ð0, 0Þ þ q2ð0, 0Þ
q1ð0, 0Þ þ q2ð0, 0Þ þ q3ð0, 0Þ
 k
() k  2 1 2cð Þ
3 2c :¼ kðcÞ: (7)
Suppose that each laggard firm has a symmetric amount of R&D in equilibrium,
xi ¼ xj ¼ x: Then the total quantity produced is strictly increasing in the R&D level
and equal to:




Hence, we can see that consumer surplus defined by CS ¼ 12Q2 is increasing in the
amount of R&D performed.19
At the first stage of the game we consider three different scenarios in which the





 2  cx2i
2
 F, i ¼ 1, 2: (9)
The second possibility is free R&D cooperation, where the laggards set their R&D
efforts cooperatively, in separate labs, in order to maximize joint profits.20 Using (5)















The third possibility is restricted cooperation where the cooperating firms’ set R&D





where Q ¼ q1 þ q2 þ q3 from (5) and (6).21 Proposition 1 gives the amount of R&D,
output and profits for each scenario. To make sure that all of the solutions exist, and






The following proposition characterizes equilibrium for each case (see Appendix A
for proof).23
Proposition 1. For each type of R&D scenario, symmetric equilibrium is characterized by




8c 2ð3 bÞð1þ bÞ , i ¼ 1, 2: (13)
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Pnci ¼
ð12cÞ2cð8cð3bÞ2Þ
8ð4cðbþ 1Þð3bÞÞ2  F, i ¼ 1, 2 (14)
Pnc3 ¼
2cð1þ 2cÞðbþ 1Þð3bÞ
2 4c ðbþ 1Þð3 bÞð Þ
 2
: (15)
ii) Free R&D cooperation is possible for k  2cð12cÞ
cð32cÞð1þbÞ2 :¼ kðb, c, cÞ giving
xci ¼
ð12cÞð1þ bÞ
2ð2c ð1þ bÞ2Þ i ¼ 1, 2 (16)
iii) Restricted R&D cooperation is possible for kðb, c, cÞ> k> kðcÞ, entailing
xRi ¼
2cð2kÞ2þ 3k
2 bþ 1ð Þ 2 kð Þ , i ¼ 1, 2 (17)
qRi ¼ qi ðxRi , xRj Þ ¼
k
2 2 kð Þ , i ¼ 1, 2 (18)
qR3 ¼ q3ðxRi , xRj Þ ¼
1k
2 kð Þ (19)
PRi ¼
2k2 1þ bð Þ2c 2cð2 kÞ  2þ 3kð Þ2
8 bþ 1ð Þ2 2 kð Þ2






We assume that F is small enough to ensure positive profits in all cases. Note that
2
3 >
kðb, c, cÞ> k̂ðb, c, cÞ> 0 when (12) holds.
In the case of R&D competition, firms set their R&D efforts individually, without know-
ing the effort of the rival. When the laggards cooperate freely on R&D investment, the
condition k  kðb, c, cÞ in part (ii) ensures that the laggards can achieve the optimal
cooperative R&D investment without violating the market share condition. When this is
not possible, the laggards get as close as possible to the cooperative solution by setting
R&D so that they exactly fulfill the allowed market share (restricted cooperation).
The condition kðb, c, cÞ> k> kðcÞ in part (iii) ensures that free R&D cooperation is
not possible, and that the ex ante market share of the laggards is not too large as to
discount some sort of R&D collaboration.24 The restricted level of R&D is affected
negatively by an increase in spillover (i.e. @x
R
i
@b <0), since the firms have to limit their




since an increase in the market share limit would leave firms with a higher range of
possible R&D investments without violating this constraint. Note also that - in contrast
to the other cases - the level of restricted R&D is increasing in original production
cost, c. For any given market share limit, k, more R&D is required to get to this market
share, the less efficient are the partners initially.
From (20), we can deduce that laggard profit is strictly increasing in k for
kðb, c, cÞ> k> kðcÞ: Additionally PRi ðkÞ ¼ 8ðbþ1Þ
2ð12cÞ2
ð32cÞ2 F; we assume that the fixed
cost of R&D is small enough to make this positive, and hence profit is positive for all
8 D. J. CLARK ET AL.
kðb, c, cÞ> k> kðcÞ: Whether the profit function in the case of restricted cooperation is
convex or concave in k is parameter-specific.
3. Analysis
3.1. R&D levels
From Halmenschlager (2004) we know that xci 0 x
nc
i if, and only if, b0
1
3 : When spill-
overs between firms are relatively low (b< 13) there will always be more R&D invest-
ments in R&D competition compared to the case with free cooperation. This is due to
the low effect from the internalization of the spillover externality, leaving R&D invest-
ments as strategic substitutes. On the other hand, when the spillover rate is larger
(b> 13), R&D investments become strategic complements as we can see from (5). We
are, however, interested in comparing R&D cooperation that is restricted by the mar-
ket share limit with R&D competition. In the following Proposition we provide the con-
ditions where restricted R&D cooperation leads to higher investments than R&D
competition; here we define k̂ðb, c, cÞ :¼ 4cð12cÞ2cð32cÞðbþ1Þð3bÞ such that xRi ðk̂Þ ¼ xnci ðk̂Þ: In
the following, we often drop the dependence of k , k̂ and k on the model parameters
for ease of reading.
Proposition 2. i) For b 2 0, 13
 
, xnci > x
R
i . ii) For b 2 ð13 , 1 and c> c then xRi > xnci if
k > k> k̂ , and xnci > x
R
i if k̂ > k> k:
This result is derived simply by comparing the expressions for xnci and x
R
i for
k > k> k: When b 2 0, 13
 
, k̂ > k , and there is no value of the market share limit that
equates the two expressions. Part ii) of Proposition 2 is visualized in Figure 1.
Compared with the competitive R&D situation, offering a safe harbour will increase
investments if there are sufficient spillovers in the R&D technology, and if the market
share limit is sufficiently large. In other cases, the block exemption regulation will not




i þ F are strictly increasing and strictly convex in k.
For the block exemption regulation to actually increase R&D as compared to a fully
competitive situation, it must also be in the interests of the firms to cooperate in this
manner. We turn now to when restricted cooperation is an optimal R&D strategy from
the perspective of the laggards.
Figure 1. Relative R&D levels, b 2 ð13 , 1:
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3.2. Optimal R&D strategy
Firms’ R&D investments are driven by the search for profits. If the market share limit is
set so that restricted cooperation is a feasible strategy, the firms might still choose to
compete in R&D if this gives the largest profits. Therefore the difference in profits
between R&D competition and the restricted R&D cooperative determines the lag-
gards’ economic incentives to engage in R&D agreements.25 The following proposition
characterizes the optimal R&D strategy of the laggards.






i for b 2 ð13 , 1, c> c and k > k> k̂:
Proof. Recall that @P
R
i
@k > 0, and that P
nc
i is independent of k. It is straightforward to
verify that Pnci PRi ðk ¼ kÞ> 0, given that b 2 ð13 , 1 and c> c: As k is increased, the
difference Pnci PRi falls monotonically, reaching zero at k ¼ k̂ (implying xRi ¼ xnci ). As k
is increased further towards k , we have that PRi >P
nc
i : w
With the results in Propositions 2 and 3, parameter combinations can be identified
such that the incentives of the EU (who desire more R&D, and higher consumer sur-
plus) and laggard firms (who seek profit) are aligned and when they are mismatched.
This is depicted in Figure 2, where we suppress arguments other than c for simplicity
in the expressions for kðcÞ, kðcÞ and k̂ðcÞ: It is straightforward to verify that these
curves are all are downward sloping, and concave in c as drawn.
The area between the dashed lines defines parameter combinations for which the lag-
gards can choose the safe harbour without violating the market share restriction. The solid
line in the figure delineates the profit motive for using the block exemption, and in the






i , the safe harbour gives most R&D and consumer sur-
plus, and is the optimal strategy of the laggards. Here the incentives of the regulating
authority (EU) and the firms are completely aligned. Note that this area is larger, the larger






i , the safe harbour policy is possible
to use, but it does not increase R&D over the competitive situation, and gives the laggards
Figure 2. Aligned and mismatced incentives.
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less profit; incentives here are mismatched. Laggards that are too efficient initially will not
choose the safe-harbour strategy, since they will hit the market share cap quickly.
3.3. Welfare
Welfare consists of the sum of consumer surplus and the profits of all three firms. In








2 2 kð Þ2
 c xRð Þ2 þ 2F
	 
(22)
¼ 2 bþ 1ð Þ
2 3 4k þ 3k2ð Þc 2cð2 kÞ  2þ 3kð Þ2
4 bþ 1ð Þ2 2 kð Þ2
2F: (23)
The expression in (22) consists of four terms: the first is the combined profits of the
laggards (gross of R&D expenditures) using (20); the second is the profit of the leader
from (21); the third is consumer surplus from the sum of (18) and (19), and the fourth
is the total cost of R&D from the two laggards, using xR to represent the common
R&D level from (17). Denoting the first three terms as the surplus from the product
market, we can see that this is only affected by the level of the market share restric-
tion k. Indeed, it is easily verified that the product market surplus is a convex function
of k with a minimum at k¼ 0.25. The convexity of this function is due to the relative
effects that increasing the market share restriction has on laggard profits and con-
sumer surplus (positive) and leader profit (negative).
As mentioned in the introduction, responses to the previous and currently ongoing
evaluation of the R&D block exemption have indicated that the market share restric-
tion should be increased from its current level. From an economic point of view, it is
interesting to know how this will affect welfare. This is, however, not simply a matter
of determining the shape of WR and then finding a maximum point since firms only
prefer to use the safe harbour for k > k> k̂: Hence, we need to determine the optimal
choice of k (denoted kW) in this region.26
Social welfare can be a concave or convex function of k which is increasing or
decreasing in the market share limit. It does, however, have a unique turning point
which is given by kTP where
@WR
@k
¼ 0 () kTP ¼ 4c 1 2cð Þ 1þ bð Þ
2
2 c 3 2cð Þ  2 1þ bð Þ2
	  :
Depending on the specific values of the model parameters, this turning point can
be a maximum or minimum. Proposition 4 - proved in Appendix B - characterizes the
welfare-maximizing choice of the market share limit:
Proposition 4. Define ~c :¼ ð3bÞð1þbÞ22ð2cð1þ9bÞð7b1ÞÞ, and consider k 2 k̂ , k
 
, b 2 ð13 , 1, c> c:
i. If c 2 ð0, 7b12ð1þ9bÞÞ, then kW ¼ min kTP, kf g;
ii. If c 2 ð 7b12ð1þ9bÞ , 7b14ð5b1ÞÞ, then kW ¼ min kTP, kf g for c 2 ðc, ~cÞ, and kW ¼ k̂ for c> ~c;
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iii. If c 2 ð 7b14ð5b1Þ , 12Þ, then kW ¼ k̂:
The welfare maximum depends critically on the initial level of efficiency of the
laggard firms. When the initial production cost is low (case i), and the laggards are
already quite efficient, social welfare is either increasing in k in the permitted inter-
val, or reaches a maximum point. For initially inefficient laggards (case iii), the wel-
fare function is either decreasing in the whole region, or it has a minimum so that
the optimal market share limit is at either end of the range. The proof of
Proposition 4 shows that WRðk̂Þ>WRðkÞ for the parameters in this region, so that
the lowest market share limit (k̂) is optimal. For intermediate initial levels of pro-
duction cost (case ii), the R&D cost represented by c is important for finding the
welfare-maximizing market share limit. When this parameter is high then increasing
the market share limit from k̂ will lead welfare to fall, making k̂ the optimal
choice; for lower levels of the R&D cost, it is welfare improving to increase the
market share limit; either the maximum point of welfare will be reached at kTP, or
this point lies beyond k , in which case k is welfare optimal. Proposition 4 is
illustrated in Figure 3.
When the laggard firms are quite efficient in their production (area (i) in
Figure 3, corresponding to Proposition 4i), then the block exemption regulation
increases the R&D and profit levels of the collaborators compared to the non-
cooperative outcome. Even if it is not feasible to set the market share limit that
gives the welfare maximum, then increasing the market share limit above k̂ will
attain the goals of the policy by increasing R&D and hence consumer surplus. This
is also true for area (ii) where firms are less efficient initially, but where R&D costs
are sufficiently low (Proposition 4ii). When R&D costs are high, or the firms are
very inefficient initially (area iii), the welfare optimum implies setting the market
share limit at k̂ since further increases lead to a fall in welfare (Proposition 4iii).
Recall, however, from Proposition 3 that this gives the same R&D and profit levels
as the non-cooperative solution. In these cases, the block exemption policy will
not work.
Figure 3. Welfare-maximizing market share limit.
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4. Three firm R&D
In the analysis so far, we have assumed a significant asymmetry between the firms
that exploit the block exemption, and the one that does not since the latter does not
perform R&D as it already has a zero cost. It is natural to ask to what extent our
results depend upon this quite strong assumption. In this section, we demonstrate
that the qualitative effects identified previously are still present when all firms perform
R&D, although the reasoning behind the results is different. Whilst it is technically pos-
sible to solve a general model in which the dominant firm has a lower initial cost than
the rivals, a different level of R&D cost, and differential spillover rates, the analysis
involves so many parameters that its interpretation becomes problematic. To show
the effects at work when all three firms perform R&D, we present a very simple model
in which two firms have the same initial production cost, and the dominant firm has a
lower production cost; all three have identical cost of R&D, and there are no spillovers
between firms. It is well known that when the spillover is small, that free cooperation
gives less R&D than a non-cooperative solution. Here, we are considering a restricted
form of cooperation so that this result will not necessarily hold. We show below that
when two firms join together to exploit the block exemption, an interesting strategic
situation appears that has been masked in the analysis to now.
After having performed R&D, the ex post production cost is ~ci ¼ cxi, i ¼ 1, 2 and
~c3 ¼ c3x3, where c  c3: Now the model is characterized by the parameters c, c3, c, k:
At stage 1, firms decide R&D investments, and production takes place at stage 2 as
before. Suppose that firms 1 and 2 cooperate in their R&D so that each performs an
amount x at stage 1, and firm three has x3. Production at stage 2 is then characterized
by functions qiðc, c3, x, x3Þ:27 In setting the cooperative R&D level, and staying within
the block exemption, the R&D level x is chosen to solve
q1ðc, c3, x, x3Þ þ q2ðc, c3, x, x3ÞP3
i¼1qiðc, c3, x, x3Þ
¼ k: (24)
Hence, adhering to the block exemption gives a rule for the R&D of the laggards in
terms of the initial cost parameters, the market share and the R&D of firm 3. In
Appendix C this is shown to be
x ¼ 1
2
k þ 2ð Þx3 þ 2c 2 kð Þc3 2þ kð Þ þ 3k2
2 k (25)
so that laggard R&D increases with the amount of R&D of the leader. This reaction -
which has not appeared in the analysis until now - is taken account of by firm 3 at
stage 1 to determine the optimal level of R&D which maximizes






This gives the amounts of R&D as xBERðc, c3, c, kÞ and xBER3 ðc3, c, kÞ further specified in
Appendix C. Note that the R&D of 3 does not depend on the initial cost of the lag-
gard. A series of observations follow from these expressions, and these are detailed in
Appendix C.28
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Proposition 5.
1. xBER is strictly convex in k.
2. If c> 1c1þc32c, then
oxBER
ok > 0, while x
BER > 0 for 1> k> K:
3. If 1c1þc32c > c> 1, then
oxBER
ok > 0 and x
BER > 0 for all k.
4. If 1c1þc32c > 1> c> 2ð1k2kÞ
2, then xBER > 0 for all k, and has a unique minimum point




5. xBER3 > 0 and
oxBER3
ok <0 for all k:
6. Let XBER ¼ 2xBER þ xBER3 . Then XBER is strictly convex in k. Furthermore, for
c> 32 ,
oXBER
ok > 0 for all k 2 0, 1½ ; for 32 > c> 2ð1k2kÞ2, then XBER has a unique minimum






First, xBER is a strictly convex function of k. Second, if R&D cost is too high, then the
market share restriction must be above a critical level, K, to admit positive R&D; how-
ever laggard R&D is increasing in k in this region. Third, intermediate R&D cost means
that R&D is always positive, and increases when the market share restriction is
increased. Fourth, for low R&D cost, R&D by the laggards is positive, and is first
decreasing and then increasing in k, so that there is an interior minimum point for
R&D investments. Fifth, the leader always has positive R&D and this is always decreas-
ing in the market share restriction. Finally, total R&D is a strictly convex function of k.
In terms of the EU goal of using the block exemption to increase total R&D, this part
of the proposition is important. If R&D cost is large enough, then increasing the mar-
ket share limit will indeed increase total R&D; for small R&D costs, total investment
reaches a minimum point for an interior value of k. Hence, a policy of increasing the
market share limit will cause total R&D to fall if we are currently to the left of the min-
imum, and increase it if the current situation is to the right. Importantly, identifying
the minimum point depends only on the R&D cost for the industry, and not the initial
cost parameters of the firms; this can be important information for the regulating
authority, since it depends on information relating to the industry in general and not
the specific participants.
Even at this level of simplicity, the expressions for profit and welfare become diffi-
cult to interpret. To carry out an analysis of this we need to simplify further by setting
c3 ¼ c so that all three firms can carry out R&D, and two of them cooperate under the
block exemption regulation. 29 With three symmetric firms, final profit to each in the




1 cð Þ2 c 8c 9ð Þ
8c 3ð Þ2 F: (27)
Suppose that firms 1 and 2 were to join together to perform R&D under the block
exemption. Given that the joint profit is strictly concave in the R&D investment as
before, a binding market share restriction means that these firms set their common
R&D level so that their market share is exactly k:
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xBER x3ð Þ ¼ 12
x3 2þ kð Þ 2 3kð Þ 1 cð Þ
2 k : (28)
Note that this is a best response function for the cooperating firms who set R&D
depending upon the level chosen by rival 3; this information is then utilized by 3 in
maximizing its own profit at stage 1. Hence the exploitation of the block exemption
by two of the firms introduces an asymmetry into the symmetric model which is dif-
ferent to the one introduced by pure joint profit maximization where firms take
account of the externality that they cause each other. The resulting levels of R&D in
this case are
xBER3 ¼
2 1 kð Þ2




4 1 kð Þ2 2 3kð Þ 2 kð Þc
	 
2 kð Þ2c 2 1 kð Þ2
1 cð Þ:
Final profit for each cooperating firm is then
PBER1 ¼ PBER2 ¼
cX
8 2 kð Þ2c2 1 kð Þ2
	 2 1cð Þ2F
X   3k2ð Þ2 k2ð Þ2c2 þ 2 k  2ð Þ 28k  34k2 þ 13k3  8ð Þc16 k1ð Þ4
(29)
Furthermore, social welfare under the block exemption is
SWBER ¼ cU
4 2 kð Þ2c2 1 kð Þ2
	 2 1cð Þ23F
U   3k2ð Þ2 k2ð Þ2c2 þ 2 k  2ð Þ 39k  42k2 þ 15k3  14ð Þc8 k1ð Þ4
As before, we are interested in identifying when cooperating firms prefer this strat-
egy to non-cooperation, and to look at how social welfare reacts to changes in the
market share restriction @SW
BER
@k : This is visualized in Figure 4a,b.
The figures depict results for different combinations of c and k, since the produc-
tion cost simply enters all expressions in this reduced model multiplicatively; the fig-
ures are divided at c ¼ 98 which is the lowest R&D cost parameter that fulfills the
second-order condition in the non-cooperative R&D problem. Hence Figure 4a gives
the comparison between the regimes when both can exist, and Figure 4b gives the
welfare implications when only the block exemption regime can be used.
Consider first Figure 4a. By doing no R&D, each firm secures a third of the market,
earning a profit of ð1cÞ
2
16 in the symmetric three-firm model. To want to use the block
exemption, participating firms must get more profit than they would under both a
regime with no R&D, and one with non-cooperative R&D. Within the heavy lines in
Figure 4a, the block exemption is strictly preferred by the participating firms.30 This
occurs for a high market share level due to the fact that firms are symmetrical at the
outset.31 Also marked are lines at which changing the market share has no effect on
social welfare (@SW
BER
@k ¼ 0). Three areas are marked in Figure 4a: in areas I and III, for
both high and low levels of k, increasing the market share leads to a fall in social
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welfare, whereas it increases in area II. Hence, for a given level of R&D cost, c, it is pos-
sible to find a value of the market share limit that maximizes welfare.
In Figure 4b, the firms do not perform non-cooperative R&D, and areas A and B
represent parameter combinations that give the participating firms more profit from
using the safe harbour than doing no R&D.32 The market share restriction that mini-
mizes social welfare is on the locus between the two areas. Figure 4a,b indicate the
difficulty of using the block exemption as a” one size fits all” regulation. In a market
that is characterized by high R&D costs (Figure 4a), increasing the market share limit
will initially lead to an increase in welfare, attaining a maximum and then falling.
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When R&D cost is low as in Figure 4b, welfare will initially fall as the market share limit
is increased, rising only after the minimum point is reached.
5. Conclusion
Competition authorities must often balance between regulating cooperation that may
harm competition, and fostering cooperation that may be economically beneficial. On
the one hand, research cooperation may be seen as leading to collusion in the prod-
uct market (Martin 1995) and lower R&D intensity (Scott 2008), but on the other may
convey incentives to innovative activity that may otherwise not have occurred
(Hagedoorn, Link, and Vonortas 2000). In the US, legislation is largely case-based
according to a rule of reason analysis, whereas the EU has attempted a pragmatic,
rule-based approach with a block exemption given that a market share limit is not
breached. Prior to the 2010 revision of the EU R&D block exemption, and as part of
the recent public consultation, several companies and institutions submitted views
that block exemption was useful but that the 25% market share limit should be
changed. Much legal advice is available to those who draft agreements within the
confines of the block exemption, suggesting that the safe harbour is utilized even
though the actual agreements are not a matter of public record. Economists debate
informally the use of the block exemption and the setting of the market share limit,
although little analysis has appeared in the formal literature.
This paper has attempted to start to fill this gap given that the period for the cur-
rent legislation runs until the end of 2022. Previous work has focused on symmetric
firms and that the block exemption can be used simply by fulfilling the market share
limit ex ante of R&D investment. Our point of departure is that R&D firms that might
use the block exemption are attempting to catch up to a superior market leader, and
that the agreement should be sustainable ex post of the R&D efforts. Whether firms
cooperate on R&D within the block exemption or whether they compete is an eco-
nomic decision that we investigate. Furthermore, we have investigated how this
affects the amount of R&D and consumer surplus, delineating cases in which firms
and consumers have aligned interests, and when they are in opposition. A general
welfare analysis revealed a nuanced view in the setting of the market share limit.
Raising the limit has two opposing effects on welfare: first it distributes more produc-
tion to less efficient firms, and second it encourages efficiency-enhancing R&D activity.
Setting the market share limit must balance these effects, and one cannot take for
granted that an increase in this will be welfare improving.
Given the conflicting effects that the market share limit has on total welfare, it
would seem to be a sensible goal for the block exemption policy to lead to an
increase in R&D investment (which in turn benefits consumers), rather than a general
increase in welfare. We have, however, demonstrated a difference in how R&D levels
react to changes in the market share limit depending upon whether the leading firm
performs cost-reducing R&D or not. When laggards attempt to catch up to a passive
leader, then we have shown that the incentives of the cooperating firms and the EU
can be aligned, and that increases in the market share limit will increase R&D invest-
ment. On the other hand, when the technological leader also performs R&D, the effect
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is not so clear cut. In industries where R&D is expensive to do, then quite little is per-
formed by the firms, and increasing the market share limit even a little may encourage
more R&D. When R&D is inexpensive, the firms need a large increase in the market
share limit before they will increase their R&D spending. The” one size fits all” nature
of the block exemption will not necessarily be able to fulfill the goal of the policy in
this case.
The model that we have used is simple, but its conclusions striking. Checking the
robustness of the results would require looking at a more detailed market in which
firms are asymmetric initially, and in which some perform R&D whilst others do not.
Ideally, one should incorporate uncertainty on behalf of the firms as to whether they
are actually within the market share limit, since in our model a simple mechanical cal-
culation allows exploitation of all of the gains from operating within the restricted
cooperative. It would also be instructive to analyze how different specifications of the
block exemption may affect behavior. Here we have taken simple market share, but
one could also imagine using a measure based on increases in market share, or profits
shares. Additionally, one would like to be able to consider the fact that firms cooper-
ate on R&D with several others, in different markets and using different instruments
(such as R&D merger, joint labs and knowledge sharing). We have also restricted the
strategic choices of the partners to either cooperate within the block exemption or
compete in R&D. Partners may also choose to cooperate outside of the block exemp-
tion, and face any penalties that the legal system may provide for if such cooperation
is in contravention of competition law. These are topics for future research.
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Notes
1. Source: Eurostat.
2. Article 4,7 and 9 of Commission Regulation 1217/2010. See European Union (2010).
3. In the United Sates, The National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993 has -
in part - the goal of increasing the number of R&D joint ventures entered into by US firms
(Hemphill 2003). No specific market share limit is set, but joint ventures are assessed under
the rule of reason. See Scott (2008) for more details.
4. See for example https://prodstoragesam.blob.core.windows.net/highq/64,578/eu-
competition-rules-horizontal-agreements.pdf. See also Le Frapper (2012).
5. Our model is one of process innovation in the spirit of D’Aspremont and
Jacquemin (1988).
6. D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), and most relevant to our work Halmenschlager (2004).
7. See https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/17/business/17drug.html.
8. https://www.ft.com/content/5327ff12-2aaa-11de-8415-00144feabdc0.
9. The original legislation was passed in 2000 (Regulation No 2659/2000), see European
Commission (2000). Replies to the public consultation can be found at https://ec.europa.
eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/horizontal_archive _en.html. The following examples
are taken from this consultation.
10. For informal discussions see for example http://www.ipdigit.eu/2013/11/is-rd-cooperation-a-
steppingstone-to-collusion/.
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11. This happened between November 6th 2019 and February 12th 2020. See https://ec.
europa.eu/competition/consultations/2019_hbers/index_en.html.
12. The case of R&D output spillovers as modelled initially in D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988).
13. The leader is assumed to use state of the art technology, and does not receive knowledge
spillovers from the competitors. Leiponen and Byma (2009) suggest that small firms that
cooperate in research tend to limit the amount of R&D leakage to larger competitors by
using the speed to market or trade secrets.
14. The importance of the ex post product market is outlined in Commission Regulation 1217/
2010, and also in the antitrust literature. Meissner and Markl (2005, 206) write that ”the
antitrust treatment of R&D cooperations should rely on ”safe harbours” defined in terms of
the combined ex post market shares of the firms involved”.
15. Cabon-Dhersin and Gibert (2019) assess the role of subsidies in the promotion of R&D
cooperation and non-cooperation.
16. In our model, the leader’s marginal production cost is zero, ruling out further efficiency
gains. In its Global Innovation 1000 study for 2017, leading consultancy firm ‘Strategy&’
find that many of the most innovative companies do not necessarily spend large amounts
on R&D. See https://www.strategy-business.com/feature/What-the-Top-Innovators-Get-
Right?gko=e7cf9. Furthermore, Coad (2011, 1055) states that” Leader firms who are at the
industry frontier, are already close to the limits of productive efficiency that can be
achieved through existing production technologies”.
17. Halmenschlager (2004) assumes the gap between leader and lagging firms to be non
drastic, which in our model implies c< 12 : This is also referred to as the catching up effect.
It can readily be seen from the analytical expressions that this is necessary for positive
laggard production and R&D levels.
18. See Amir, Jim, and Troege (2008) Proposition 5.
19. This is also true if xi 6¼ xj since Qðxi, xjÞ ¼ 32cþðxiþxjÞð1þbÞ4 which is increasing in the sum of
R&D investments.
20. We model cooperation at the R&D stage as a joint profit maximization but other
possibilities exist such a R&D merger or maximization in individual labs and knowledge
sharing as in Ferrett and Poyago-Theotoky (2016).
21. The lead firm has a production cost of zero, and - independent of the R&D regime - the
two laggards can at most achieve the same zero cost; this leads to an equal three-way
split of the product market. Hence the combined ex post market share of the two laggards
cannot exceed 23 :
22. When condition (12) is fulfilled, the maximand in each case is a strictly concave function of
R&D investment.
23. Only the equilibrium expressions that are necessary for facilitating the analysis are given in
Proposition 1. Other expressions are given in Appendix A for completeness.
24. Note that k> kðcÞ ensures that xRi > 0:
25. In a model of uncertain product innovation, Capuano and Grassi (2019) explicitly
endogenize the firms’ decision on whether or not to cooperate.
26. Note that by choosing k > k> k̂ , Proposition 3 applies so that the regulation is used to
implement higher R&D and profit levels for those who perform it than would arise from
non-cooperative behavior.
27. Calculations are presented in Appendix B; just necessary equations are reproduced in
the text.
28. The critical value K is also defined in Appendix B.
29. This is similar to the symmetric model of Ruble and Versaevel (2014), with the important
exception that we consider agreements that fulfill the block exemption also in the ex post
production market.
30. Indeed, it is the regime with no R&D that is next best in this case, with the non-
cooperative model being worst in terms of profit for firms 1 and 2:
31. Initially, before R&D, each firm would expect to serve one-third of the market.
32. The heavy line is the second-order condition for the maximization problem of firm 3.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) Maximizing (9) using (5) gives the following first-order condition:
1
8
3 bð Þ 1 2cþ 3 bð Þxi þ xj 3b 1ð Þ
  ¼ cxi:
Solving this for xi ¼ xj gives xnci in (13). The second-order condition and stability condition






, and this is automatically fulfilled for c> c in (12). On
the stability condition in R&D models see Henriques (1990). Inserting xnci into (5), (6), (3) and (4)
gives the other expressions in part (i). For completeness, note that
qnci ¼ qðxnci , xncj Þ ¼
cð12cÞ
4c ðbþ 1Þð3 bÞ i ¼ 1, 2 (A1)
qnc3 ¼ q3ðxnci , xncj Þ ¼
2cð1þ 2cÞðbþ 1Þð3bÞ
2 4c ðbþ 1Þð3 bÞð Þ : (A2)
(ii) Differentiating (10) with respect to xi gives the first-order condition:
1
4
1 2cð Þ 1þ bð Þ þ xi 5 6bþ 5b2
 
þ xj 10b 3b2  3
 	 
¼ cxi:
Solving this for xi ¼ xj gives xci in (16). The following expressions are recovered by substitution
qci ¼ qi ðxci , xcj Þ ¼
cð12cÞ
2ð2c ð1þ bÞ2Þ i ¼ 1, 2 (A3)
qc3 ¼ q3ðxci , xcj Þ ¼
cð1þ 2cÞðbþ 1Þ2
2ð2c ð1þ bÞ2Þ (A4)
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Pci ¼
ð12cÞ2c






The second-order condition for the cooperative case is c> ð1þbÞ
2
2 : Positive q
c
3 is ensured for c>
ð1þbÞ2
ð1þ2cÞ :
Both are fulfilled for c> c in (12). Using (A3) and (A4), the market share of the cooperating firms is
2c 1 2cð Þ
c 3 2cð Þ  1þ bð Þ2 :¼
k b, c, cð Þ
and this does not violate the market share restriction as long as k  kðb, c, cÞ:
(iii) From (5) and (6), the market share of the cooperating firms given xi ¼ xj ¼ x is
2
12cþ 2x 1þ bð Þ
3 2cþ 2x 1þ bð Þ
Solving for this market share equal to k gives xRi in (17). The other expressions are recovered
by substitution. Restricted cooperation is allowed if kðb, c, cÞ> k> kðcÞ:
Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 4
Differentiating the welfare function with respect to k gives a unique turning point denoted by
kTP in the text. If the turning point is located in the interval k 2 k̂ , k
 
, then the welfare function
will have slopes of different signs at each end of the interval; if the turning point is outside of
this interval, then the welfare function will either be increasing or decreasing in the whole inter-






¼ sign 2 7b 1ð Þ  2c 1þ 9bð Þ½ cþ 3 bð Þ 1þ bð Þ2: (B1)
This is generally dependent on c, but is certainly positive if the term in square brackets is non-
negative, i.e. for 7b12ð1þ9bÞ  c, which is the bottom region in Figure 3. In this region, the welfare func-
tion is increasing in k at the bottom of the interval. Measured at c ¼ c, (B1) is certainly negative for
c  5b14ð7b1Þ , which is the top region in Figure 3. Increasing c from the minimum level makes the
slope a larger negative number, so that in the top region of Figure 3 the welfare function is decreas-
ing at the bottom of the interval. For intermediate levels of c ( 5b14ð7b1Þ > c>
7b1
2ð1þ9bÞ), the slope is
negative (positive) for c> ð<Þ ð3bÞð1þbÞ22ð2cð1þ9bÞð7b1ÞÞ ¼ ~c (the middle region of Figure 3).




jk¼k ¼ sign c 1 6cð Þ þ 1þ bð Þ2: (B2)
This is certainly positive for 16  c: The value of (B2) is negative (positive) for c> ð<Þ ð1þbÞ
2
6c1 for





Consider part (i) of the Proposition. When c 2 ð0, 7b12ð1þ9bÞÞ, either the welfare function is
upward sloping at both ends of the interval (so that kW ¼ k), or it slopes upwards at k̂ , and
down at k for c> ð1þbÞ
2
6c1 , giving k
W ¼ kTP as the interior maximum of welfare. In part (iii) of the




W ¼ k̂), or increasing for lower values of c, implying that kTP gives a
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minimum of the welfare function. Hence welfare will be maximized at one of the endpoints of
the interval. The difference in welfare WRðk̂ÞWRðkÞ is a strictly convex function of c with two
real roots cþ > c > 0: Direct calculation reveals that c> cþ, so that WRðk̂ÞWRðkÞ> 0 for all
permitted c, so that kW ¼ k̂ for the region considered in part (iii).
The type of welfare maximum depicted in part (ii) is parameter dependent. Consider first
c>~c: If c> 514 , then ~c>
ð1þbÞ2
6c1 , and the slopes of the welfare function are negative at each end
of the interval; hence kW ¼ k̂: If c< 514 , then ~c< ð1þbÞ
2
6c1 , then two possibilities occur. Either
ð1þbÞ2
6c1 > c>~c in which case the slope of W
R is negative at k̂ and positive at k , so that kTP is an
interior minimum, and WRðk̂ÞWRðkÞ> 0 implies kW ¼ k̂; or c> ð1þbÞ26c1 >~c which implies that
the slope of the welfare function is negative at both ends of the interval and hence kW ¼ k̂:
Thus for c>~c, the optimal choice of market share limit is kW ¼ k̂: For ~c> c> c, @WR@k > 0 at k̂ ,
and the slope at the top of the interval is positive or negative depending on whether c is below
or above ð1þbÞ
2
6c1 : Hence, the welfare function will either be upward sloping over the whole inter-
val (kW ¼ k), or it will have an interior maximum and kW ¼ kTP:
Appendix C
Proof of Proposition 5
Let ~ci ¼ cixi be the production cost of firm i after performing R&D. At the production stage,






Given c1 ¼ c2 ¼ c, the quantities produced at stage two are
q1 x1, x2, x3ð Þ ¼ 1þ c32cþ 3x1 x2 þ x3ð Þ4
q2 x1, x2, x3ð Þ ¼ 1þ c32cþ 3x2 x1 þ x3ð Þ4
q3 x1, x2, x3ð Þ ¼ 1þ 2c3c3 þ 3x3 x1 þ x2ð Þ4 :
The symmetric amount of R&D performed by firms 1 and 2 solves (24) giving (25) in the text.
Then the production of firm 3 is
q3 x, x, x3ð Þ ¼ 1k2 k 1 c3 þ x3ð Þ
















1 c3 þ x3ð Þcx3 ¼ 0
with second order condition






Solving the first order condition gives the final expression
xBER3 ¼
2 1 kð Þ2
c 2 kð Þ2  2 1 kð Þ2
1 c3ð Þ
which, inserted into (25), yields the symmetric R&D investments of firms 1 and 2:
xBER ¼ 1
2
cð2c 3þ c3Þ þ 4 1 cð Þ
 
k2 þ 8 c 1ð Þ 1 cð Þk þ 4 1 c c 1 2cþ c3ð Þð Þ
c 2 kð Þ2  2 1 kð Þ2
Let W ¼ ðcð2c 3þ c3Þ þ 4ð1 cÞÞk2 þ 8ðc 1Þð1 cÞk þ 4ð1 c cð1 2cþ c3ÞÞ, which is
a quadratic expression in k.
Part 1
Taking the second derivative of the R&D function gives
@2xBER
@k2
¼ 2c 1 c3ð Þ 2 2 k
ð Þ3c2 þ 3 k  2ð Þ 9k þ 2k2 þ 6ð Þcþ 2 11 2kð Þ 1 kð Þ2
c 2 kð Þ2  2 1 kð Þ2
	 3
where the sign is determined by the sign of the numerator, which is quadratic in c. This expres-
sion is convex in c, and has positive value at c¼ 0. The slope of the quadratic is negative at c ¼
0 for k< 0.81386, implying that any real roots are negative for k> 0:81386: For k> 0.81386, the
roots to this quadratic are
c ¼ 1
4
6k2 þ 1827k6 ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi28k þ 81k220k3 þ 4k428p
2 kð Þ2
:
It is straightforward to verify that these roots are real only for k> 0:89436, but as established
above, they are negative in this area. So for all values of k, the numerator is positive and the
second derivative @
2xBER





¼ 2c 1 c3ð Þ k  2
ð Þ2c 1 kð Þ 4 kð Þ
c 2 kð Þ2  2 1 kð Þ2
	 2
the sign of which depends on the numerator. @x
BER
@k > ð<Þ0 for c> ð<Þ ð1kÞð4kÞð2kÞ2 2 0, 1½ : Since this
latter expression is bounded between 0 and 1, and this part assumes c> 1c12cþc3  1 (which fol-
lows from c  c3), then @xBER@k > 0:
The expression xBER has a negative value at k¼ 0 if c> 1c12cþc3  1: With this assumption,
xBER has a negative value at k¼ 0, and is increasing in k, whilst part 1 has established convexity.
Hence there will exist a value k (denoted K) such that k> K gives xBER > 0: This is found as the






4ð1cÞcð32cc3Þ : We must establish 1> K: Given the monotonicity of W,
this can be accomplished by checking that Wðk ¼ 1Þ> 0: Evaluating gives Wðk ¼ 1Þ ¼
cð1þ 2c 3c3Þ which is least likely to be positive when c3 is large. However, c3 ¼ c is the larg-
est value for this variable, in which case 1þ 2c3c3 ¼ 1c> 0
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Part 3
When 1c12cþc3 > c> 1, then
@xBER
@k > 0 follows from part 2; furthermore, W has positive slope and




@k ¼ 0 gives a unique solution for k 2 0, 1½  as k ¼ 12 54c
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
98cp
1c , and this is a minimum
since xBER is strictly convex in k. If W> 0 for this minimum point, then xBER > 0 for all k. The con-
dition W> 0 at the minimum reduces to ð1c3Þ
2
ð1cÞð12c3c3Þ > c: It can readily be established that
ð1c3Þ2
ð1cÞð12c3c3Þ > 1 for
1
2 > c  c3, and since 1> c is assumed in this part of the proposition, the
claim is proven.
Part 5
That xBER3 > 0 is obvious given the assumptions made. Furthermore
@xBER3
@k
¼ 4c 1 c3ð Þ 1 kð Þ k  2ð Þ
c 2 kð Þ2  2 1 kð Þ2
	 2 <0:
Part 6
Differentiating XBER ¼ 2xBER þ xBER3 twice gives
@2XBER
@k2
¼ 8c 1 c3ð Þ 2 k
ð Þ3c22 2 kð Þ 8k þ 2k2 þ 5ð Þcþ 4 4 kð Þ k  1ð Þ2
c 2 kð Þ2  2 1 kð Þ2
	 3
so the sign is given by the sign of H ¼ ð2 kÞ3c22ð2 kÞð8k þ 2k2 þ 5Þcþ 4ð4 kÞðk  1Þ2
which is quadratic in c. Furthermore, H is strictly convex in c and has a positive value at c¼ 0;
it has a positive slope at c¼ 0 for k> 0.77526. Hence, for k> 0.77526, H is certainly positive.
The roots of H are not real for k< 0.875. This implies that H is positive for all values of k, and
XBER is convex in k.
The slope of total R&D is given by
@XBER
@k
¼ 4c 1 c3ð Þ c 2ð Þk
2 þ 8 4cð Þk þ 4c 6ð Þ
c 2 kð Þ2  2 1 kð Þ2
	 2
and the sign is determined by the numerator D ¼ ðc 2Þk2 þ ð8 4cÞk þ ð4c 6Þ: Solving





for 32 > c> 2ð1k2kÞ2: Since XBER is a
convex function of k, this marks a minimum point. When c> 32 , the roots of D are either nega-
tive or larger than 1; combined with the fact that D> 0 at k¼ 0, gives the result that @XBER@k > 0
for c> 32 :
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